Dynamic Channel Pruning for Privacy

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Abstract

Increased deployment of deep learning services on remote cloud instances requires users to share their sensitive information with un-trusted parties. Correspondingly, we focus on private inference in these distributed learning setup via sharing of intermediate activations instead of raw inputs. Specifically, we design a dynamic pruning strategy to mitigate information leakage from activations and empirically validate effectiveness of the proposed technique. We analyze performance and discuss ethical considerations for deploying allied services for general availability.

1 Introduction

With increasing deployment of deep learning applications on the cloud, users are required to share their sensitive data with parties that they do not necessarily trust. We propose a method where individuals can perform inference (prediction) tasks by sharing activations from an intermediate layer instead of the raw sensitive data. However, a dishonest entity (server) may attempt to utilize these intermediate activations to reconstruct the input or predict sensitive attributes. We design a dynamic pruning strategy to mitigate information leakage from activations. Channel pruning in deep network compression posits that there is significant representational redundancy in learned activations [2, 15, 22, 7] and seeks to eliminate it in order to reduce computational complexity and accelerate inference. We hypothesize that privacy sensitive information in a given image is a result of underlying human interpretable features and pruning corresponding channels can help suppress leakage of sensitive information. Specifically, we focus on mitigating attribute inference attacks where a dishonest server (or adversary) intends to extract private characteristics (sensitive attributes) of the raw input while also preserving utility which is defined by accuracy on a main task (on a prediction attribute). Correspondingly, we propose a dynamic channel pruning technique mechanism to selectively hide sensitive attributes and achieve a privacy-utility trade-off by adjusting the number of channels to be pruned. We show the efficacy of our proposed mechanism by analyzing the performance of the main task and a simulated adversary. The simulated adversary tries to mimic a worst-case attacker who uses a subset of intermediate activations for obtaining sensitive information.

Threat Model

The first step to address any privacy or security concern is to perform the threat modeling for the system. In our setup, the deep learning model \( h(\theta) \) is distributed across client and server, client generates the above-mentioned intermediate activations \( z \) from the raw input \( x \), and server processes these activations \( z \) for the prediction. These client and server models are denoted by \( f(\theta_1) \) and \( g(\theta_2) \) respectively such that \( h(\theta; x) = f(\theta_1; g(\theta_2; x)) \). To protect the raw input \( x \), the client communicates \( z = g(\theta_2; x) \) to the server which then generates the output prediction \( y_T = f(\theta_1; z) \) for a main task \( T \). While \( y_T \) is information that the server can visualize and process, an adversary may additional seek to leverage \( z \) to extract a private attribute \( y_p \) of the input \( x \). Depending upon the formulation of \( y_p \), the attack by the adversary can be: a) reconstruction attack where goal is estimate the input (i.e. \( y_p = x \)) b) attribute inference attack where \( y_p \) is a sensitive attribute.
attribute associated with $x$ that the client intends to keep private. Under this threat model, information leakage attacks can manifest in three ways:

- **Learning based attacks** - In the learning based methods, the attacker trains a separate adversary model $f_A(\theta_3; \cdot)$ by obtaining a set of publicly available or leaked records of $(x, z)$ pairs. In computer vision literature, this is also referred as expected pre-image \[5\].

- **Optimization based attacks** - In optimization based approaches, the weights $\theta_2$ are known to the adversary. The adversary starts out with a random image $x_0$ and optimizes it to obtain $x^* = \arg \min_{x_0} \ell(g(\theta_2; x_0), z)$. Additional regulariser like total variance \[12\] terms have shown to improve performance of the reconstructed image.

- **Prior based attacks** - This aligns with the work done in image restoration tasks using priors like deep image prior \[19\]. This attack scheme is the strongest of all because it does not assume any prior knowledge about leaked subset or knowledge of the weights of the model.

## 2 Related Work

**Privacy-preserving learning** has majorly focused on privacy of training data, especially in distributed learning settings. The key techniques for distributed training include federated learning \[13\], where entire models are trained on local data at client, and split learning \[8, 20\], where models are split between client and server with communication via intermediate activations. To preserve privacy, various mechanisms have been proposed for secure aggregation \[3\] and to reduce information leakage from (trained) model parameters \[1, 18\]. While majority of the work has been done for privacy of the training data, focus of this work is privacy of data in distributed inference.

**Private inference** Osia et al. \[16, 17\] propose sharing extracted features and give upper and lower bounds on the information gap between the prediction task and sensitive information. NoPeek \[21\] proposes distance correlation minimization as a technique for reducing information leakage and Shredder \[14\] adds a noise distribution to the intermediate private activations. DeepObfuscator \[11\] uses adversarial training to prevent reconstruction and attribute leakage attacks. In this work, we focus on selectively pruning intermediate representations to prevent leakage of sensitive information.

**Channel pruning** is a predominant technique for deep network compression to minimize computational complexity and accelerate inference \[4\]. While most methods interleave pruning with the training phase \[2, 15, 22\], there has been recent focus on pruning at inference \[7\]. \[7\] gradually prunes channels at fixed intervals during training using a feature relevance score to minimize compute cost. \[7\] propose dynamic feature boosting and suppression (FBS) to predictively amplify salient convolutional channels and skip unimportant ones at run-time for accelerated inference. In this work, we focus on channel pruning at inference to prevent leakage of sensitive information.

## 3 Dynamic Channel Pruning Network

In this section we discuss our dynamic channel pruning network for reducing leakage of sensitive attributes from raw input images. As illustrated in Figure[1] the proposed model consists of four key components, namely client network, filter generating network, task network, adversary network utilized over two distinct stages.
Step accuracy of adversary
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
25 50 75 100 125 150
Network Pruning (Ours) Random Pruning No Pruning

(a) Performance comparison on the adversary task. The higher it is, more the privacy leakage occurs for the sensitive attributes.

Network Pruning Random Pruning No Pruning
Step Accuracy on task
0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85
25 50 75 100 125 150

(b) Performance comparison on the target task. The higher it is the better is the performance of the system.

Figure 2: Evaluation of the proposed method: we evaluate the performance of our method by baselining it against random pruning and no-pruning procedure. We use fairface as the dataset with two image classification objectives, the adversary task is race prediction (7-class problem) while the target task is gender classification (2-class problem).

Stage 1 - Channel Pruning: First the input sample $x$ goes through the client network to generate the intermediate convolutional volume $z \in \mathbb{R}^{h \times w \times c}$. Then, the filter generating network takes this intermediate activation $z$ and generate a feature map score $F_{\Theta} \in \mathbb{R}^{c}$ for each channel in $z$. The $F_{\Theta}$ channel pruning filters are weakly discretized using sigmoid with temperature (to avoid introducing discontinuity) and then thresholded to obtain a binary vector $b$. This obtained vector $b$ is multiplied channel wise with $z$ to produce a pruned feature volume $\hat{z}$ with channels corresponding to the private representations masked out (or deactivated). Note that $F_{\Theta}$, the feature map score, is conditioned on $z$ (hence $x$) and is thus generated dynamically on run-time. A hyperparameter pruning ratio, is used to define the number of active channels, and helps regulate the privacy-utility trade-off.

Stage 2 - Task Prediction: Next, the pruned activations $\hat{z}$ are consumed by the task network and adversary network to obtain the corresponding output predictions. Both these predictive networks consist of convolutional and fully-connected layers, in order, to generate their outputs.

Training: The adversary network and task network have access to supervised labels and attempt to minimize their losses. The filter generating network is trained to minimize the loss for the task network and maximize the loss for the adversary network simulating an implicit min-max optimization for these two components. The client network parameters are only optimized with the loss for the target network. We deliberately prohibit gradients flow from adversary to the client network to ensure that the filter generating network generalizes and does not trivially utilize representations learned by the client network. We posite that this facilitates the filter generating network to specialize at pruning by identifying the privacy leaking channels.

4 Experiments and Results

Experiments are conducted with the Fairface dataset [10] on the task of image classification. The dataset consists of 108,501 face images each tagged with race, age and gender attributes. We specifically select this dataset because of an equitable class balance across different (7) race categories which prevents the trained models from bias towards particular any demographic. We baseline the proposed dynamic channel pruning setup with two configurations:

- **Random Pruning**: Channels are randomly pruned from $z$ conditioned on the pruning ratio.
- **No Pruning**: No channels are pruned from $z$ (i.e. $\hat{z} = z$)

For scope of this study, experiments use the ResNet-18 [9] architecture with the first 6 convolutional layers as part of the client network. Additional (hyper)parameter details include: Adam optimizer (LR = 1e-2; Batch Size=64) with 4 NVIDIA 1080Ti GPUs.

We experiment with two distinct configuration: a) Prediction Attribute: Gender and Sensitive Attribute: Race  b) Prediction Attribute: Race and Sensitive Attribute: Gender. The results are
(a) Performance evaluation for sensitive attribute prediction and studying at risk groups. Here, the adversary network appears to be predicting majority of the input samples as White, except few percentage of samples in the group Middle Eastern and Latino Hispanic which get correctly identified.

(b) Evaluating target task performance across different demographics. We compare performance of the main task (gender classification) segregated by the categories in private task (race classification), so as to study influence of pruned channels for the privacy leakage reduction task.

Figure 3: Experiments dedicated to study ethical considerations of our proposed approach and evaluating whether one particular group of individuals is at more risk than the others.

presented in figure 2. We observe that the proposed dynamic pruning approach achieves significantly better privacy-utility trade-off than the baselines. With race as sensitive attribute (7 class; chance acc: 14%), dynamic pruning results in an accuracy of 20% for the adversary while with random and no-pruning, the adversary network achieves accuracy of 43% and 40% respectively. Further, while achieving superior performance with the adversary network, dynamic pruning also maintains same accuracy as the baselines on task network. We obtain similar trends with gender as sensitive attribute (2 class; chance acc: 50%). Due to limited space, we only include plot for the more challenging (as lower chance accuracy) configuration of race as sensitive attribute.

5 Discussion

Ethical Consideration We additionally focus on granular demographic level privacy-utility trade-offs for the individual race categories in the dataset, East Asian, Indian, Black, White, Middle Eastern, Latino Hispanic, Southeast Asia. Results in figure 3 indicate that while the adversary network can correctly classify majority of validation examples in White category and small minority of Middle Eastern and Latino Hispanic, predictions for all other classes are completely erroneous. Furthermore, we extend this same analysis to the target network, being trained on gender prediction in the particular setup. Results in figure 3b show that incorrect predictions are distributed equally across the different race categories.

Privacy-Utility Trade-off In this work we present empirical evidence for the protection of sensitive information, however, for any practically deployable private system, we would require worst case privacy guarantees about the information leakage of data or sensitive attributes. It is important to highlight that the privacy vs utility trade-off depends on what we define as the sensitive task and target task, and how much these two objectives differ. The channel pruning mechanism is based on the hypothesis that each channel roughly disentangles different attributes about the input sample and a subset of them can be pruned.

6 Conclusion

In this work we propose a method for enabling inference on cloud by sharing intermediate activations instead of sharing raw data. To reduce the privacy leakage of the shared data, we perform channel pruning on the client side. The design of the proposed method can go beyond channel pruning for CNNs to a general latent space pruning procedures for feed-forward networks and its other variants used in language models like RNNs and transformers. Future work includes rigorous evaluations of different training configurations and theoretical guarantees to understand privacy and utility trade-off.
References


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